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The fundamental problem of North-South relations
today is the absence of a real intellectual consensus on
the functioning of the world economy. The Keynesian
consensus which guided the establishment of the
Bretton Woods institutions and, in certain respects,
some of the early post-war work on development
cooperation policy has all but outlived its usefulness.
Similarly, there used also to be, but there exists no
longer, a broad convergence of views among
developing countries, concerning at least some of the
policy prescriptions emanating from the centre-
periphery model of economic relations between states
which has guided the work of UNCTAD since its
inception.
Today we are trying to understand the functioning ofa
world economy which in both its cyclical and secular
aspects seems to elude the postulates of conventional
theory. In particular there is still no real agreement on
what were the origins of the present crisis.
Controversy still rages among economists and within
governments as to what were the relative contributions
to the crisis of three main factors: first, the policy
responses of the major developed market-economy
countries to the problem of stagflation in the 1970s;
second, the effects of the two oil price increases on the
distribution of balance of payments disequilibria and
their financing; and third, the underlying shifts that
have been occurring in international comparative
advantage and the associated increase in protectionism.
The structural aspects of the crisis are equally obscure.
What are the implications of technological change for
world production and trade? Is the world economy
becoming more polycentric in character and what are
the implications of this for global economic
management? Are the developed economies them-
selves entering a phase of slower growth? Until greater
clarity is achieved on a number of these questions,
policy responses to the present situation will inevitably
tend to rely upon intuitive judgements and shots in the
dark.
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The prevailing international policy response to the
problem of development and world recovery largely
reflects the view which is dominant among the major
developed market-economy countries. This view is
that there will be a spontaneous recovery in the
international economy and therefore that the only
action necessary now is to arrange for a modest
increase in the IMF's resources. The passage of recent
events has not sufficiently validated this point of view.
It is true that there are some indications of a fairly
robust consumer-led recovery in the United States, but
it remains to be seen whether the subsequent
investment is at a high enough level and sufficiently
durable to transmit powerful stimuli to the rest of the
world. It is also too early to take comfort from the
increases that have occurred in some commodity
prices, which in a number of cases are due more to
special supply factors than to any significant
improvements in demand. In any event, any
improvement in earnings from commodity exports
will most probably be utilised for debt service and to
rebuild international reserves rather than to purchase
import and stimulate activity at home and abroad.
Moreover, even if the recovery were to prove well-
founded, the measures taken by developed market-
economy countries to increase the capital resources of
multilateral development finance institutions have
fallen far short of what is required in relation even to
the most optimistic growth expectations. Simultan-
eously, commercial bank lending has shrunk to all but
a few countries, as has direct investment. Even for
some of those countries for which rescue operations
have been mounted the unending process of
negotiation and renegotiation of packages illustrates
the inadequacy of present efforts. For others,
although rescue operations seem to be producing
results in relation to the balance of payments, this has
been achieved at high social costs in terms of output
losses and mounting unemployment. Finally, the
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outlook is poor for significant increases in bilateral
official development assistance which could compen-
sate to some extent for the failures of these other
resource flows.
A number of proposals designed to take these matters
forward were laid on the table at the sixth session of
UNCTAD last year. But in the majority of cases
agreement was not reached and little has subsequently
been done. I believe that the absence of intellectual
consensus as to the origins and nature of the world
economic crisis was the ultimate cause of these failures
at UNCTAD VI, though it will be the task of future
scholarship to establish exactly why the opportunity
was missed to give the world economy a much-needed
shot in the arm and to unblock the stalemate in North-
South relations.
The failure to reach agreement at UNCTAD VI was all
the more striking in relation to the general acceptance
there of the concept of interdependence, both as it
applies between developed and developing countries
and between major sectors of international economic
activity. Practically every delegation that took the
floor during the plenary debate stressed its acceptance
of the concept and the link between development and
recovery which was a corollary of it. Yet as I have
already indicated the conference failed to reach
concrete agreement on the basic elements of an action
programme in these areas.
There are at least two positive lessons which one might
draw from the failure of the conference to transform
the concept of interdependence into an operational
reality. The first is that interdependence and mutual
interest do not necessarily imply an identity of interest
among the countries in both North and South. It is
not, therefore, persuasive enough to argue simply in
terms of the overall macroeconomic spin-off effects of
a policy package for development and recovery. One
has to disaggregate the package and examine what the
net effects will be on each country. It is possible that
some developed countries, even indeed some develop-
ing countries, while accepting the macroeconomic
logic of an overall policy package, might nonetheless
judge that the benefits to them are not sufficient to join
in a consensus, or that the maximisation of their
particular net national benefits requires a differently
constituted policy package. One of the interesting
features of UNCTAD VI, evidenced in the content of
plenary session interventions and the voting record on
some major issues, was the differences in policy
positions between individual developed countries.
Examples of this were the efforts made by some
developed countries to make progress on monetary
questions, especially compensatory financing, in the
face of continuing opposition by others, whose main
concern was to secure new commitments in the field of
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international trade. Developing countries ought to
reflect on this and ask themselves whether there is not
an opportunity here to work on an issue-by-issue basis
with like-minded countries. Such an approach
suggests that the Group of 77 should talk separately
with individual developed countries and groups of
countries to ascertain their precise interests and how
these can be accommodated within an overall
multilateral package. For consistency these steps
should be taken in the framework ofa well-coordinated
series of multi-bilateral consultations and negotiations.
Technical work will be required to identify those
policy areas where it is feasible for developing
countries to negotiate a family of arrangements with
individual countries and groups. There is a precedent
for this in the Generalised System of Preferences. It
would be useful to explore how under contemporary
circumstances this approach can be applied, for
instance in regard to the compensatory financing of
shortfalls in commodity export earnings, official
development assistance and the refinancing of official
debt, to quote three possible examples. As a corollary,
the Group of 77 should consider developing a set of
common guidelines for North-South trade and
economic negotiations between limited groups of
countries. These guidelines could inter alía provide for
transparency in these negotiations in order to
safeguard the cohesion of the Group of 77 itself and to
promote the multilateralisation of the results as
appropriate.
The second lesson which one might draw from
acceptance of the concept of interdependence is that it
has opened up expectations of reciprocity in global
bargaining. In future, developing countries may have
to face squarely the problem of what quid pro quo
could be offered in a global bargain over and above
any positive transmission effects to northern economies
that would arise from accelerated development in the
South. They would have to decide whether it is in the
interest of all to negotiate in some areas at a
multilateral level or on a systematic multi-bilateral
level rather than through a series of uncoordinated
bilateral efforts. An example of this is the issue of
foreign direct investment, which up to now has not
been the subject of multilateral negotiations and
where it is not evident that bilateral negotiations are
yielding the best results attainable for the developing
countries concerned, sometimes even setting bad
precedents for other countries. All of this is to say that
if North-South relations are to make any real progress
in the future, both sides must examine how they can
improve the scope, modalities and techniques of
negotiations through a more appropriate mix of
bilateral, multi-bilateral and multilateral arrange-
ments based upon the specific interests of individual
countries and country groups.
That in itself represents an enormous intellectual and
technical challenge to the scholarly community. But
there is also an urgent need for technical evaluation of
development experiences and strategy at the national
level. The experience so far of individual developing
regions and countries with the recession has raised
serious questions about the effectiveness of different
strategies of development. This is particularly the case
in Latin America where virtually all of the
development models have run into trouble, ranging
from open monetarism to state capitalism, embracing
a variety of mixed economies following strategies of
import substitution and/or export-led growth. In
some of the countries in that region and countries in
other regions no systematic strategy has been followed
at all. There development policy in recent years has
been little more than a series of ad hoc responses to
day-to-day events. In disentangling the impact of the
crisis on individual countries, it is not easy to
determine the precise interaction between exogenous
factors and endogenous factors relating to economic
structure and policies. A case in point is the difference
in recent economic performance between the three
regions of the Third World. By and large over the past
three years Asia has experienced reduced rates of
growth but still managed to achieve an annual average
of about four per cent growth. Particularly striking is
the experience of India which lifted its growth rate in
1980-8 1 to about six per cent and, despite the setback
that took place in 1982, may well have achieved a
growth rate above that in 1983. By direct comparison
the years 1980-82 have witnessed negligible growth in
Africa and for the last two of those years negative
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.
It would be rather interesting to do a careful
comparative assessment of experience with the
recession as between India and Brazil say, to see what
has been the impact of differences in the composition,
origin and destination of trade and financial flows,
production structure and economic organisation. For
instance, it is fairly evident that Brazil's greater
reliance on Euro-market borrowing partly accounted
for the more severe impact of high interest rates on its
balance of payments. Likewise, one is led to speculate
whether the importance of the rural sector and of
small-scale enterprise in the Indian economy served as
insulating factors from the world recession. An
interesting outcome of the crisis in Latin America and
the Caribbean has been the virtual explosion in small-
scale entrepreneurship which has occurred in response
to it. Many of the cities in that region are now
overflowing with a variety of small-scale producers
and vendors from middle income groups, in some
cases trying to supplement fixed incomes eroded by
inflation, and in others to compensate for the
shrinking of employment opportunities. It would be
extremely useful if this phenomenon could be studied.
The evidence it provides of latent entrepreneurship in
the system could be valuable for planning and for
assessing future options in development strategy.
1f interdependence is to be managed successfully, it
must imply a greater willingness of countries to discuss
their national experiences and strategies at the
international level. Developing countries have been
rather shy of this, preferring to confine such
discussions to bilateral dialogues with sources of
finance. Although this has the advantage of
confidentiality in dealing with particularly sensitive
issues, it has the disadvantage of limiting the range of
policy advice open to those countries. There is also a
tendency, happily now being slightly modified, for
sources of finance to show an exclusive preoccupation
with short term adjustment of the balance of payments
and to neglect longer term growth potential and social
needs. It is vital that developing countries be
encouraged to take a longer view of their development
potential and carefully assess, in as pragmatic a
manner as possible, what alternative paths they can
take to help its achievement. Despite the mistakes
made with development planning in the 1950s and
1960s there is really in my opinion no substitute for a
well-defined economic strategy. This is borne out by a
number of the so-called success stories, South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, to quote three examples, where
export-led strategies were not merely products of
market processes but also of active government
policies.
I come finally to the role of South-South cooperation
in future development strategy. Apart from the work
that was done in the 1960s on regional integration by
some individual scholars and research institutes, the
subject of South-South cooperation or ECDC
(Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries)
as it is presently called has not commanded much
attention from the academic community in developed
countries. Yet several analysts in the developing
countries themselves are pinning great hopes on
ECDC as an effort in collective self-reliance and as the
best response to the less favourable prospects of the
world economy in the decades to come. Indeed, it is
argued that the strengthening of South-South
cooperation can significantly enhance the collective
bargaining power of the developing countries and
thereby improve their position in North-South
relations itself.
It is important in this context to be aware of the
negative impact that the recession has had on South-
South cooperation. Global data show that between
the first half of 1981 and the first half of 1982 the
contraction in intra-trade among developing countries
was greater than in the trade of developing countries
with the rest of the world. Expressed in percentages of
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their exports to the world as a whole, intra-trade fell
from 27.5 per cent of total exports in the first half of
1981 to about 25 per cent of total export in the first half
of 1982. Since then there has been some rebound in the
share of intra-trade but detailed data are not yet
available to assess the actual experiences at the
regional and sub-regional levels. There are also
indications that some of the regional integration
groupings have run into serious difficulties because of
the foreign exchange difficulties of partner states. In
some cases, this involves setbacks with trade
liberalisation and expansion and with the operation of
financial instruments facilitating the expansion of
trade. Because of the importance of this subject,
UNCTAD devoted part of its 1983 Trade and
Development Report to a preliminary analysis of
recent patterns of South-South trade and finance, and
to a simulation of the potential importance of this
trade to the growth of developing countries and the
world as a whole. The simulation illustrates the
considerable scope that still exists for expanding intra-
trade, and shows that this can have a positive impact
on growth in both North and South.
This is very much of a first effort; more refined and
elaborate models are needed to inform policy-making.
Aggregative models need to be supplemented by
careful country studies of the potential contribution of
South-South cooperation to national development. If
South-South cooperation is to become a major aspect
of development then the modalities and instruments of
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cooperation need to be formally rooted in a precise
identification of country capacities and potential. One
of the problems of integration schemes has been that
many of them were initially based upon models
developed for European integration with insufficient
attention being paid to local circumstances. Patching
up has subsequently proved to be a costly process.
As I have suggested, the many difficult decisions that
face both North and South in the period ahead raise a
formidable array of research questions. I would place
particular importance on the last issue I have
discussed, namely ECDC. There is a need to restate
and elaborate the theoretical case for South-South
cooperation, especially on a global basis. Theoretical
work has not advanced much beyond the original
adaptation of the Viner-Meade model of economic
integration to take account of the peculiar features of
developing countries, giving emphasis to the impor-
tance of critical minimum size and economies of scale
in industrialisation. The theory needs to be extended
to embrace cooperation in areas other than trade, to
include the wider concepts of collective self-reliance
and collective economic security, which have attracted
considerable attention at the political level, and to
examine the part that the ECDC process can play in
strengthening the position of developing countries in
the world economy. Only then can there be a proper
foundation for new negotiating approaches that will
take place primarily, but not exclusively within
UNCTAD, and which may come to distinguish the
work of its second 20 years.
